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1. Introductory remarks
Individuals who are in the custody of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
may apply for provisional release at any time before or during their trial. Most applications for provisional 
release were fi led at the pre-trial stage and, in some cases, provisional release was granted between the initial 
appearance of the accused and the beginning of the trial, since the pre-trial phase can be quite prolonged at 
the ICTY. However, a number of applications were fi led during trial and also after a conviction, pending an 
appeal, as provided by Rule 65, paragraph I of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE),1 as in two 
of the cases under discussion.
The law and jurisprudence of the ICTY (and also of the International Criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) 
have signifi cantly changed over the years, shifting from a very strict interpretation of the criteria provided 
in Rule 65 of the ICTY RPE to a less stringent approach, resulting both from a number of amendments to 
Rule 65 itself, as well as from an evolving construction of the requirements that must be fulfi lled in order to 
render provisional release possible. These developments occurred mainly to take into account international 
human rights norms and standards, with a view to striking a proper balance between the risks posed by the 
potential release of an individual tried for the most serious international offences and his or her right to a fair 
trial.
2. State of health and fi tness to stand trial
Although the state of health of the defendant is not explicitly enumerated in Rule 65 of the ICTY RPE as a 
condition to be taken into consideration when deciding on the provisional release of an accused, the ICTY 
has consistently considered this factor in determining whether or not to grant an order for provisional release. 
Indeed, on the very fi rst occasion that the ICTY decided to grant provisional release to an accused, the 
decision was taken on medical grounds. By that time, before the 1999 amendment to Rule 65, which deleted 
the reference to “exceptional circumstances” from paragraph B, the state of health of the accused could be 
evaluated as an exceptional circumstance justifying provisional release.2 In this respect, notwithstanding the 
amendment of the rule, the practice of the ICTY has not signifi cantly changed and the medical condition of 
the defendant has been taken into consideration on a case by case basis and continues to be accepted as a 
valid ground to grant provisional release only in exceptional cases, in particular where adequate treatment 
for the accused could not be provided at the United Nation Detention Unit (UNDU).
The situation was quite complex in the Kovačević case,3 where the decision to grant provisional release was 
taken together with the decision to suspend the proceedings against the accused for an initial period of six 
months, subject to a number of terms and conditions. In this case, the diffi cult task of the judges was not 
limited to ascertaining the medical condition of the defendant and its compatibility with detention, but it 
implied an assessment of the accused’s fi tness to stand trial, since the defence raised the question of the 
ability of the accused to enter a plea and to stand trial due to a serious mental disorder.
Since the initial appearance of Kovačević, the Trial Chamber was unable to conclude whether the accused 
had the mental capacity to enter a plea and to stand trial. After the reports of the medical experts appointed 
by the Trial Chamber and the defence, as well as the assessment provided by the UNDU psychiatrist, the 
judges came to the conclusion that the mental disorder suffered by the defendant rendered him temporarily 
unfi t to stand trial. As a consequence, the Trial Chamber granted provisional release to the accused, on the 
condition that he was to receive medical treatment in a specialized institution in Serbia and Montenegro as 
well as a number of other conditions.
It is worth noting that a few days prior to this order, Trial Chamber II delivered a decision (in the Strugar 
case) in which the conditions of fi tness to stand trial were discussed at length, with particular reference to 
1 Rule 65, paragraph I was adopted in 2000, at the 22nd Plenary Session of the Judges of the ICTY.
2 ICTY, Decision Rejecting the Application to Withdraw the Indictment and Order for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. 
Djukić, Case No. IT-96-20-T, T. Ch. I, 24 April 1996. 
3 ICTY, Decision on Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Kovačević, Case No. IT-01-42/2, T. Ch. I, 2 June 2004, in this volume, 
p. 53.
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mental capacity.4 In that decision, the judges affi rmed that “fi tness to stand trial is a matter which, although 
undoubtedly connected with the physical and mental condition of an accused person, is not confi ned to 
establishing whether a given disorder is present” and, more specifi cally, it held that “the issue is not whether 
the accused suffers from particular disorders, but rather is better approached by determining whether he is 
able to exercise effectively his rights in the proceedings against him”.5
The Trial Chamber also listed, on a non-exhaustive basis, a number of capacities that the accused must 
possess in order to stand trial and which the judges should weigh up in an overall assessment. In conclusion, 
it maintained that the consequences of fi nding an accused unfi t to stand trial are likely to vary according to 
the specifi c circumstances of each case. Amongst the various possibilities, according to this decision; “in 
cases where the unfi tness to stand trial is a temporary condition, it may prove appropriate to merely adjourn 
the trial and to continue when the accused has suffi ciently recovered”.6
This seems to be exactly the situation that inspired the decision of Trial Chamber I in the Kovačević case. 
The Trial Chamber made it clear that the suspension and the order for provisional release were necessary not 
only to provide relief to someone in need of treatment, but also in order to ascertain whether the accused, 
after adequate treatment, would be capable to stand trial in the future.7
In sum, the deletion of the exceptional circumstances requirement did not impede the ICTY from tackling 
the delicate question of the mental condition of a defendant. Despite the lack of clear indications in the ICTY 
Statute or ICTY RPE, the decision of the ICTY Trial Chambers made a signifi cant contribution to the 
practice of international criminal tribunals in setting clear standards and criteria to establish competency to 
stand trial, and in proceeding to the concrete application of such standards when deciding about the issuance 
of an order of provisional release, as was the case in the Kovačević decision.
3. Provisional release pending an appeal: length of detention and proportionality
In its decisions in the Čerkez8 and Kvočka et al. cases,9 the Appeals Chamber dealt with the application of 
Rule 65, paragraph I of the ICTY RPE, concerning provisional release pending an appeal. The rule sets three 
conditions that must be verifi ed before granting provisional release.10 Being cumulative, if a Chamber is not 
satisfi ed with any one of the three conditions, it may decide not to examine the others, as was the case, for 
instance, in the Čerkez case.
In that case, the Appeals Chamber only addressed the fi rst requirement, that is whether the appellant, if 
released, would either appear for the hearing of the appeal or would surrender into detention at the end of the 
period fi xed by the Chamber. In striking the balance between the previous cooperative behaviour of the 
4 ICTY, Decision re the Defence Motion to Terminate Proceedings, Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, T. Ch. II, 
26 May 2004, in this volume, p. 187.
5 Ibid., par. 35.
6 Ibid., par. 39.
7 It is worth recalling that also the ICTR Trial Chamber in the Nahimana et al. case ordered that one of the accused be 
submitted to a medical, psychiatric and psychological examination to determine whether he was fi t to stand trial, but did not dwell 
on the elements of such capability. See ICTR, Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No. 
ICTR-99-52-T, T. Ch. I, 3 December 2003, Klip/ Sluiter, ALC-XVII-221, par. 52 (“Pursuant to a motion fi led by the Defence for 
Ngeze for a medical, psychiatric and psychological examination of Ngeze, and after having heard the parties in a closed session on 
19 February 2001, the Chamber granted the motion in a closed session on 20 February 2001. The resulting medical report verifi ed 
that Ngeze was competent to stand trial. Subsequent to the report’s fi ndings, counsel for Ngeze did not pursue the matter any 
further.”) It is also worth mentioning that Rule 135 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) RPE envisages, following a medical 
examination of the accused, that a trial may be adjourned where an accused is incompetent to stand trial, but it does not elaborate on 
the elements of the incompetence of the defendant. These defi ciencies in previous documents and case law render the decision of the 
ICTY in the Strugar case very important. 
8 ICTY, Decision on Marion Čerkez’s Request for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-
14/2-A, A. Ch., 12 December 2003, in this volume, p. 45.
9 ICTY, Decision on the Request for Provisional Release of Miroslav Kvočka, Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Radić, Žigić and Prcać, 
Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, A. Ch., 17 December 2003, in this volume, p. 49.
10 Rule 65, paragraph I of the ICTY RPE provides: “Without prejudice to the provisions of Rule 107, the Appeals Chamber may 
grant provisional release to convicted persons pending an appeal or for a fi xed period if it is satisfi ed that: (i) the appellant, if 
released, will either appear at the hearing of the appeal or will surrender into detention at the conclusion of the fi xed period, as the 
case may be; (ii) the appellant, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person, and (iii) special circumstances 
exist warranting such release. The provisions of paragraphs (C) and (H) shall apply mutatis mutandis.”
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convicted and other relevant factors, the Appeals Chamber gave precedence to considerations concerning 
the envisaged length of detention and its proportionality, which was assessed both in a large and in a narrow 
sense.
The length of detention and its proportionality have often been weighed up by the judges when deciding 
about granting an order of provisional release, both at the ICTY and the ICTR. The judges of both tribunals 
have consistently recalled the right of the accused to be tried without undue delay – often referring to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).11 However, the length of detention and its 
proportionality have always been assessed on a case by case basis, depending on the particular circumstances 
of the case.12
Therefore, not surprisingly, in these two decisions under discussion, the ICTY reached opposite conclusions. 
In the Čerkez case, the Appeals Chamber deemed the length of detention proportionate and rejected the 
motion for provisional release. The judges took into account the fact that Čerkez had voluntarily surrendered 
to the ICTY13 and that he came back before trial after the granting of an order for provisional release, but the 
weight of these factors was not enough to counterbalance other elements and risks.
In the fi rst place, the length of detention was checked against the seriousness of the crimes committed by the 
accused; a factor which in many cases renders detention as the rule and provisional release an exception, as 
both the ICTY and the ICTR have held in other circumstances.14 The gravity of the crimes is one of the 
factors that differentiates the regime of provisional release in the international context from the domestic 
systems and both the ad hoc tribunals relied on this element to reverse the ordinary presumption in favour 
of release and to justify the presumption of detention.15
The length of detention was also balanced against the envisaged length of imprisonment – 15 years, of which 
only six already passed – the remaining period of detention, being quite extensive, was deemed as creating 
a strong incentive for the appellant to fl ee. Summing up, the Appeals Chamber was not satisfi ed that Mario 
Čerkez, if released, would either appear at the hearing of the appeal or surrender into detention at the end of 
11 In the Čerkez case, the Appeals Chamber referred to European Commission of Human Rights, Bottazzi v. Italy, Application 
No. 7975/77, 13 December 1978; and to the subsequent decision in the same case, European Court of Human Rights, Bottazzi v. Italy, 
Application No. 7975/77, 28 July 1999. (see Decision on Marion Čerkez’s Request for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Kordić and 
Čerkez, supra note 8, footnote 4). However, as has been observed by Frank, “the outer limits of ‘reasonable pretrial detention’ 
embodied within the European Court of Human Rights or the jurisprudence of other international human rights organs are not 
necessarily the outer limits of the acceptable length of pretrial detention”. See M. de Frank, ICTY Provisional Release: Current 
Practice, A Dissenting Voice, and the Case for a Rule Change, 80 Texas Law Review 2002, p. 1439. 
12 In the Drljača and Kovačević case, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that “the length of an accused’s detention is a factor to be 
considered in determining whether the accused has shown exceptional circumstances suffi cient to justify his provisional release.” 
(see ICTY, Decision on Defence Motion for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Drljača and Kovačević, Case No. IT-97-24, T. Ch. II, 
20 January 1998, par. 22). This statement was reaffi rmed several times. In the Kanyabashi case, the ICTR Trial Chamber clarifi ed 
that “it however remains that, consistent with international standards, the right to be tried without undue delay and its possible 
violation has to be assessed on a case by case basis and in the light of several factors that may account for the length of one’s 
proceedings and, hence, the length of one’s detention” (See ICTR, Decision on the Defence Motion for Provisional Release of the 
Accused, Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-97-24,  T. Ch. II, 21 February 2001, par. 11 (referring to European Court of 
Human Rights, Zimmermann and Steiner v. Switzerland, Application No. 8737/79 ,13 July 1983, par. 24)).
13 In the Jokić case, for instance, the ICTY judges held that the voluntary surrender of an accused was to be evaluated in the 
assessment of the risk that the accused may not appear for trial (see, ICTY, Order on Miodrag Jokić’s Motion for Provisional Release, 
Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42-T, T Ch. I, 20 February 2002, par. 25). However, the voluntary surrender of an accused is not 
per se suffi cient to grant an order for provisional release (see ICTY, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release fi led by the Accused 
Hazim Delić, Prosecutor v. Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landžo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, T. Ch. II, 24 October 1996, p. 3.
14 See, for instance, ICTY, Order Denying a Motion for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, T. 
Ch.,  20 December 1996; ICTY, Decision on Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Šainović and Ojdanić, Case No: IT-99-37-AR65, A. 
Ch., 30 October 2002, Klip/ Sluiter, ALC-XI-149; ICTY, Decision Denying a Request for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-PT, T. Ch. I, 23 January 1998, p. 4 (“By considering the extreme gravity of crimes against humanity, 
the Rules thus establish a presumption of detention according to which detention is the rule and provisional release is the 
exception”).
15 See P. Wald and J. Martinez, Provisional Release at the ICTY: A Work in Progress, in R. May et al. (eds.), Essays on ICTY 
Procedure and Evidence. In Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/Boston/London 2001, 
p. 234-237. See also D. Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, 44 Harvard International Law 
Journal 2003, p. 577 et seq.
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a fi xed period of time. In other words, the fi rst condition set up by Rule 65, paragraph I of the ICTY RPE was 
not fulfi lled and the Appeals Chamber did not move on to consider the other two conditions.
On the contrary, in the Kvočka et al. case, the length of detention and its proportionality to the overall 
envisaged duration of detention contributed to render an order for provisional release possible. In that case, 
the Appeals Chamber applied a line of reasoning that is exactly the opposite of the one it applied in the 
Čerkez case. In fact, one of the crucial elements that allowed the appellant to be provisionally released was 
the fact that he already served approximately 81% of his sentence. This factor most likely lead the judges to 
consider as irrelevant the risk that the accused would not appear at the hearing of the appeal.
In any case, the Appeals Chamber declared itself satisfi ed with the fi rst two conditions specifi ed in Rule 65, 
paragraph I of the ICTY RPE, that is to say that the appellant, if released, “will either appear at the hearing 
of the appeal or will surrender into detention at the conclusion of the fi xed period, as the case may be” and 
that he “will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person”. In addition, it affi rmed that the fact 
that the appellant had already served most of the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber amounted to a 
“special circumstance warranting his release” as provided by the third condition specifi ed in Rule 65, 
paragraph I.
4. The setting of conditions for provisional release and the request of governmental guarantees
In both the Kovačević and the Kvočka et al. case, the Appeals Chamber decided to grant provisional release 
to the defendants subject to a number of terms and conditions, as provided by Rule 65, paragraph C of the 
ICTY RPE. The conditions set out by the Appeals Chambers varied according to the circumstances of every 
specifi c case and were intended to fulfi l different objectives. In the fi rst place, they are necessary to ensure 
the return of the defendant and his appearance at trial; secondly, they guarantee that no contact with victims 
or potential witnesses may in any way interfere with the proceedings and, more generally, that no danger is 
posed to the community of the country where the defendant is going to reside during his period of provisional 
release.
It is obvious that the ICTY must rely on governments’ cooperation to fulfi l the conditions established by Rule 
65 of the ICTY RPE: in both the Kovačević and the Kvočka et al. case, the Appeals Chamber required local 
governments (Serbia and Montenegro in the fi rst case and Republika Srpska in the second) to comply with a 
number of commitments and to assume responsibility for tasks that the tribunal is clearly unable to perform. 
These requests to local governments represent another major difference from the provisional release regime 
in domestic systems and refl ect the lack of enforcement capacities of international criminal tribunals.16
In the early history of the ICTY, the choice of the country where a provisionally released accused would be 
sent and the question of governmental guarantees represented a dilemma. The Dutch government made clear 
its opposition to – or at least outlined the practical diffi culties of – the release of an accused in The 
Netherlands.17 This obliged the ICTY to look to more distant countries, in particular to those belonging to 
the former Yugoslavia, which were available to receive those provisionally released. These countries, 
however, did not initially show a very cooperative attitude towards the tribunal and the ICTY often denied 
provisional release on the assumption that the guarantees provided by these authorities were not 
trustworthy.18
16 See ICTY, Order on Motion for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-01-46-PT, T. Ch. I, 20 February 2002, 
Klip/ Sluiter, ALC-VIII-61, par. 24 (“First the Tribunal lacks its own means to execute a warrant of arrest, or to re-arrest an accused 
who has been provisionally released. It must also rely on the co-operation of States for the surveillance of accused who have been 
released. This calls for a more cautious approach in assessing the risk that an accused may abscond. It depends on the circumstances 
whether this lack of enforcement mechanism creates such a barrier that provisional release should be refused. It could alternatively 
call for the imposition of strict conditions on the accused or a request for detailed guarantees by the government in question”).
17 ICTY, Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands Addressed to the Registrar, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, 
Case No. IT-95-14-T, 18 July 1996.
18 See, Order Denying a Motion for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, supra note 14, p. 5 where the judges expressed 
serious doubts about Croatia’s attitude: “Considering that, in fact, the Trial Chamber notes that, despite its international obligations, 
as expressly recognised by its having signed the Peace Agreements in Paris on 14 December 1996 which had been reached in Dayton, 
Croatia has already failed to satisfy its obligation to co-operate with the Tribunal; that it notes that Trial Chamber II of the Tribunal 
has taken note of the refusal of this State to co-operate in the Rajić case (Decision pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules, dated 13 September 
1996, IT-95-12-R61); and that in this case, to date, Croatia has not transferred the accused Zlatko Aleksovski whom it is holding in 
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In this respect, the perception of the ICTY seems to have at least partially changed – due to signs of improved 
cooperation with the governments of the countries where the crimes were committed – and in the decisions 
under discussion the judges declared they were satisfi ed with the guarantees fi led by the governments of 
Serbia and Montenegro and of the Republika Srpska. Actually, the shift towards a more cooperative attitude 
by these countries is one of the main reasons for the gradual increase of orders granting provisional release 
at the ICTY. Given the fact that these governments complied with court orders, the ICTY began to give 
greater credibility to their guarantees and to consider them as reliable countries to host accused persons.19
On a fi nal note, it is worth recalling, as the decision in the Kvočka et al. case clearly shows, that the ICTY 
requests guarantees from both state and to non-state entities, such as the Republika Srspka, which may not 
be considered a state according to established public international law principles. In this respect, the ICTY 
continued to follow the directions given by the Dayton Agreements of 1995, which not only restated the 
obligation of states to cooperate with the tribunal, but also extended this obligation to non-state entities.
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detention nor has it co-operated in the transfer of General Blaškić’s co-accused whose names appear in the original indictment”. See 
also the previous decision in the Kovačević case, where the Trial Chamber denied provisional release: “We fi nd, having given due 
consideration to both letters submitted by the Defence, that we are not suffi ciently satisfi ed that that the accused will appear for 
trial. It is a matter of public record that the Republika Srpska has not arrested any one of the forty-eight persons publicly indicted by 
the International Tribunal and believed to be resident in that country. We are also alive to the diffi culty of implementing any such 
guarantee or other conditions of release such as daily reporting to police authorities or house arrest.” (ICTY, Decision on Defence 
Motion for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Drljača and Kovačević, Case No. IT-97-24, T. Ch. II, 20 January 1998, par. 27).
19 See, for example, ICTY, Decision on the Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talić, Prosecutor v. Brđanin 
and Talić, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T. Ch. II, 20 September 2002, Klip/ Sluiter, ALC-XI-113, par. 39, where the tribunal attaches great 
importance to the ‘Law of Co-operation’ passed in April 2002 by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
